Modern-day attackers use sophisticated multi-stage and/or multi-host attack techniques and anti-forensic tools to cover their attack traces. Due to the limitations of current intrusion detection systems and forensic analysis tools, evidence often has false positive errors or is incomplete. Additionally, because of the large number of security events, discovering an attack pattern is much like finding a needle in a haystack. Consequently, reconstructing attack scenarios and holding attackers accountable for their activities are major challenges. This chapter describes a probabilistic model that applies Bayesian networks to construct evidence graphs. The model helps address the problems posed by false positive errors, analyze the reasons for missing evidence and compute the posterior probabilities and false positive rates of attack scenarios constructed using the available evidence. A companion software tool for network forensic analysis was used in conjunction with the probabilistic model. The tool, which is written in Prolog, leverages vulnerability databases and an anti-forensic database similar to the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD). The experimental results demonstrate that the model is useful for constructing the most-likely attack scenarios and for managing errors encountered in network forensic analysis.
Introduction
Digital forensic investigators use evidence and contextual facts to formulate attack hypotheses and assess the probability that the facts support or refute the hypotheses [5] . However, due to the limitations of forensic tools and expert knowledge, formulating a hypothesis about a multi-step, multi-host attack launched on an enterprise network and using quantitative measures to support the hypothesis are major challenges. This chapter describes a model that helps automate the process of constructing and analyzing quantitatively-supportable attack scenarios based on the available evidence. The applicability and utility of the model are demonstrated using a network attack case study.
The proposed method uses a Bayesian network to estimate the likelihood and false positive rates of potential attack scenarios that fit the discovered evidence. Although several researchers have used Bayesian networks for digital evidence modeling [3, 5, 12, 13] , their approaches construct Bayesian networks in an ad hoc manner. This chapter shows how the proposed method can help automate the process of organizing evidence in a graphical structure (called a logical evidence graph) and apply Bayesian analysis to the entire graph. The method provides attack scenarios with acceptable false positive error rates and dynamically updates the joint posterior probabilities and false positive error rates of attack paths when new items of evidence for the attack paths are presented.
Background and Related Work
Bayesian networks have been used to express the credibility and relative weights of digital and non-digital evidence [2, 3, 5, 12, 13] . Several researchers have used Bayesian networks to model dependencies between hypotheses and crime scene evidence, and have employed these models to update the belief probabilities of newly-discovered evidence given the previous evidence [2] [3] [4] [12] [13] [14] .
Digital forensic researchers have used Bayesian networks to reason about evidence and quantify the reliability and traceability of the corresponding hypotheses [5] . However, these Bayesian networks were custombuilt without using a uniform model. In contrast, the proposed model is generic and helps address the problems posed by false positive errors, analyze the reasons for missing evidence and compute the posterior probabilities and false positive rates of attack scenarios constructed using the available evidence.
Meanwhile, few, if any, tools directly support the automated construction of Bayesian networks based on the available evidence and estimate belief probabilities and potential error rates. A software tool for network forensic analysis was developed for use with the proposed probabilistic model. The tool, which is written in Prolog, leverages the MulVAL reasoning system [1, 10] and employs system vulnerability databases and an anti-forensic database similar to the NIST National Vulnerability
